

1. *Introduction*: this book argues that we should use reason and persuasion to get our way when it comes to distributive justice, and that this supports libertarianism.
2. *Morality and the state*: morality constrains the permissible state, and we should ignore radical departures from commonsense like utilitarianism when thinking about distributive justice.

Part I Property

3. *Libertarianism: a classic argument revisited*: what makes “New England” libertarianism hard to reject isn’t an obsession with individual rights, but modesty about when we may transfer our burdens to others.
4. *Property as a moral phenomenon*: property isn’t in the first instance a legal phenomenon, and morality can confer on us claims to control assets, not just by our labor but by a whole host of relevant factors.
5. *Property as a constraint on the state*: the moral basis of property constrains just institutions.
6. *Property and the creation of value*: in advanced economies wealth is mostly generated by services, not natural resources, making it harder to argue people have an equal claim to that wealth.
7. *Aid*: just because we have various obligations to help others doesn’t mean the state should enforce these.

Part II Markets

8. *Morality and markets*: there is a standing moral reason to promote markets because they let people improve their positions, and most objections to free exchange have nothing to do with markets per se.
9. *Luck and opportunity*: social status can persist for centuries, but that doesn’t show that choice is ineffective, which is what really matters.
10. *Wealth, disability and happiness*: becoming a richer country doesn’t or soon won’t make us happier, but this mainly shows that we care about far more than happiness.
11. *Popularity and incentives*: we underestimate the extent to which markets can provide signals to help us make wise decisions.

Part III History

12. *Justice and the wealth of nations I*: if capitalism is so bad, why has it worked out so well?
13. *Justice and the wealth of nations II*: if socialism is so bad, why has *it* worked out so well?
14. *Reparations, history and Nietzsche*: reparations are owed for recent historical injustices, but become less plausible further back in time for specific reasons we can detail.

Part IV Theory and practice

15. *Dilemmas of political correctness*: political correctness often has legitimate aims, but suppresses debate in ways that can backfire.
 16. *Utopia and justice in the real world*: we should be utopian about changing people's minds, but jaded about people's moral and intellectual capacities; radical shifts in governance are rarely wise, not even in the right direction.
- Appendix A: utilitarianism as self-deception*: few utilitarians exhibit much utilitarianism, prompting the suspicion that they have misunderstood their own views.
- Appendix B: victim-blaming and moral modus tollens*: perceptions of victimhood influence our understanding of causal structures and can blind us to agency.